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Exploring the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Will Government Intervention in the
Public Accounting Profession
Prevent Another Enron?
BY SALLY S. SPIELVOGEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Each Day Every Day In big cities and small towns. Away from the
headlines. We are here. Auditing financial statements. Providing tax
services. And delivering Business Insight. Counted on for our integrity.
Passionate about getting it right. And intolerant of those who break the
rules. We depend on your trust and work to earn it each day, every
day.'
C ertified Public Accountants ("CPAs") historically have enjoyed an
excellent public reputation. CPAs' involvement in Enron's
downfall, however, has taken a toll on the profession. The opening quote,
taken from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
("AICPA") first annual report since the Enron debacle, provides evidence
that the profession is serious about restoring the public's confidence in its
members.
Before Enron's downfall, companies relied on CPAs for their expertise
in providing a variety of services, including traditional audit and tax
functions and consultation, internal audit, and information system design.
CPAs were well suited for these responsibilities. Those who worked in
* C.P.A. Commonwealth of Kentucky. J.D. expected 2004, University of
Kentucky. The author would like to thank Faulkner, King, Romenesko and Wenz,
PSC for the use of their library resources. The author would also like to thank her
daughter, Roxanne Spielvogel, and her husband, Ransom E. Dotson, for their
support throughout the writing of this Note and the entire law school experi-
ence.
'AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT., 2001-2002 ANN. REP. 1 (2002), http://
www.aicpa.org/about/annrpt/2001-2002/index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
public accounting2 understood their clients' accounting systems and recog-
nized that the products of those systems3 were necessary for making sound
financial decisions. An in-depth understanding of clients' financial anatomy
allowed CPAs to tailor their services based on the clients' needs.
In 2001, events at Enron substantially affected the public accounting
profession. The public depended on Enron's audited financial statements
to make investment decisions and had confidence in the integrity of those
statements. By the time Enron filed for bankruptcy, the public felt de-
ceived because the investment decisions it had made were based on illusory
financial statements. In placing blame, the public accounting profession
was an obvious choice. In the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress saw the
need to restore the public's investing confidence. Within nine months of
Enron's collapse, the government responded by enacting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ("the Act").4
This Note will explore the Act and its effect on the public accounting
profession. Part 11 of this Note will provide a brief description of the events
at Enron with a focus on Arthur Andersen's role.5 This part will also
identify two factors contributing to the misbehavior of Arthur Andersen
employees.6 Part III of this Note will describe the regulatory framework of
the public accounting profession before the Act.7 Part IV of this Note will
describe the Act and its purpose.8 Part V will contain the majority of the
analysis of the Act.9 This section of the Note will isolate specific require-
ments under the Act and compare them with pre-Act requirements.1" This
part of the Note will also address whether the Act's requirements are
designed to deter future misbehavior similar to Arthur Andersen's
employees in the Enron debacle. 1 Part VI of this Note will address
ancillary issues in the Act including the role that attorneys played in Enron,
'For the purposes of this Note, the public accounting profession refers to CPAs
who work as a part of CPA firms.
' Products of a company's accounting system are the balance sheet, income
statement, cash flows statement, and statement of retained earnings among others.
4 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.).
3 See infra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 63-180 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 63-180 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 63-179 and accompanying text.
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studies mandated by the Act, and the potential cascade effect of the Act. 12
Part VII will conclude this Note.
3
HI. ARTHUR ANDERSEN'S ROLE IN ENRON
Arthur Andersen ("Andersen") audited the financial statements of
Enron from 1997 to 2000, and in each of those years, Andersen issued an
opinion that Enron's financial statements fairly presented the corporation's
financial condition. " The financial statements, however, omitted important
1 See infra notes 181-204 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
14 After a financial statement audit is complete, the auditor issues an "Inde-
pendent Accountant's Report" that gives an opinion on the financial statement. The
following, for illustrative purposes, is one of the reports issued by Andersen along
with Enron's financial statements (from 1997 to 2000 the opinion was the same as
the following illustration):
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
To the shareholders and Board of Directors of Enron Corp.:
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of Enron
Corp. (an Oregon corporation) and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000
and 1999, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehen-
sive income, cash flows and changes in shareholders' equity for each of the
three years in the period ended December 31, 2000. These financial
statements are the responsibility of Enron Corp.'s management. Our
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based
on our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards
generally accepted in the United States. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes
examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures
in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our
audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly,
in all material respects, the financial position of Enron Corp. and subsidiar-
ies as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and the results of their operations,
cash flows and changes in shareholders' equity for each of the three years
in the period ended December 31, 2000 in conformity with accounting
principles generally accepted in the United States.
Arthur Andersen LLP
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information about some high risk, losing investments that Enron owned and
thus did not fairly represent Enron's financial condition.
Enron, formed during a 1985 merger, was originally involved in the
natural gas pipeline industry. 5 Because that industry was highly regulated,
there was a ceiling on the rate of return that Enron could achieve. 6 To
avoid this ceiling in order to increase Enron's overall rate of return, Enron
made high risk investments in unregulated industries. 7 The company
formed special entities (known as Special Purpose Entities or SPEs) to own
those investments, and Enron was a substantial owner of those entities.' I In
addition, Enron executives personally invested in the SPEs and received
extremely high returns. One Enron in-house attorney invested $5800 and
received a $1 million windfall from her investment in the special entities. 9
Despite initial substantial returns, the risky investments eventually lost
money and thus the entities owning the investments lost money.2" As a
substantial owner of these entities, Enron lost money, too, but this poor
financial picture was not painted for the investing public.
Typically, when two entities are substantially intertwined due to
common ownership, their financial statements are consolidated before they
are presented to the public.2 If the SPEs' financial statements had been
consolidated with Enron's, Enron's financial well-being (or not-so-well-
being) would have been more fairly presented to the investing public;
ENRON CORP., 2000 10-K F-2 (2001), at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1024401/000102440101500010/0001024401-01-500010.txt (last visited No. 17,
2003).
'" Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 13 (2002).
16 See id.
Over time, [Enron's] business focus shifted from regulated transportation
of natural gas to energy trading in an unregulated environment. During this
evolution, top management ventured away from traditional approaches to
the core business in order to generate higher financial returns. According
to a Congressional Research Service Report, 'the guiding principle seems
to have been that there was more money to be made in buying and selling
financial contracts linked to the value of energy assets (and to other
economic variables) than in the actual ownership of physical assets.'
Id.
17Id"
1Id. at 13-15.
'9Id. at 18.
20 Id. at 16.
2 CONSOLIDATION OFALLMAJORITY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES, Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards No. 94 61 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2002).
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however, the financial statements of Enron and the special entities were not
consolidated.22 Enron avoided combining the financial statements of the
SPEs with its own because the accounting standards pertaining to such
combinations were vague.23 Enron's decision not to combine the financial
statements was based on a technical reading of the accounting regulations
instead of an attempt to comply with the spirit of accounting, which is to
provide an accurate portrayal of a company's financial position.
Andersen was heavily involved in Enron's financial decisions, as
evidenced by the fees received by Andersen for its services to Enron. In
2001, Andersen received $27 million for non-audit financial services to
Enron and another $25 million for audit services.24 There were two separate
times when Andersen could have advised Enron in its decision to combine
or not to combine the financial statements. First, Enron looked to Andersen
for advice when it made the initial decision not to combine its financial
statements. Second, when Andersen audited Enron's financial statements,
Andersen should have revisited the decision not to combine the financial
statements in order to issue its opinion that the financial statements were
presented fairly.26 It was Andersen's responsibility as an auditor to be
objective in determining if the financial statements should or should not be
combined.27
In hindsight, the financial statements should have been combined. The
special entities were eventually terminated due to substantial losses from
their investments.28 The September 2001 announcement that the special
entities would be terminated "was the first public disclosure even hinting
at the severity of the problems. 29 In November 2001, Enron announced
that it was restating $1.5 billion of losses by charging the losses against its
income. 30 The restatements resulted from Enron's failure to combine the
SPEs' financial statements with its own.3 In December 2001, Enron filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.3
22 Rhode & Paton, supra note 15, at 14.
23 See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SEC-SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
§ 24 (Sept. 2002).24 Mark A. Worden, Securities Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence
from Non-Audit Servicees-An Evolving Standard, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 513, 521
(2002).
25 See Rhode & Paton, supra note 15, at 15.
26 See Worden, supra note 24, at 513.
27 See id.
28 Rhode & Paton, supra note 15, at 16.
29 id.
30 id.
"' See id.
32
Id.
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Andersen erred when it did not advise Enron to combine the SPEs'
financial statements. Andersen made a greater error when it issued a clean
opinion for Enron's financial statements. However, Andersen's biggest
mistake came after Enron filed for bankruptcy, when employees of the
accounting firm destroyed documents related to Enron.33 Andersen officials
admitted that a significant number of documents was shredded between
October and November 2001." As a result, Andersen was later charged
with obstruction of justice.35
Andersen did not fare much better than Enron in the aftermath of the
scandal. One commentator noted that Andersen "derived less than one
percent of its business from Enron-related matters. Yet the accounting firm
imploded in less than a year when its other clients fled after public
exposure of the firm's alleged role in the creation of misleading public
reports of Enron investment structures."36 Indeed, the Enron debacle and
Andersen's misdeeds created suspicion of the public accounting industry.
Why did Andersen perform as it did with Enron? Andersen lacked
objectivity. William T. Allen and Arthur Siegel of the Independence
Standards Board37 listed these five threats to objectivity:
a. Self-interest threats-threats that arise from auditors acting in their
own interest ....
b. Self-review threats-threats that arise from auditors reviewing
their own work or the work done by others in their firm....
c. Advocacy threats---threats that arise from auditors or others in their
firm promoting or advocating for or against an auditee....
" See id. at 22.
34Id. ("Media reports chronicled the accumulation ofmore than eighteen trunks
and thirty boxes of documentary debris on only one of the days at one of the
offices.").
" See id. at 23.
361d. at 10.
31 William T. Allen & Arthur Siegel, Conflicts of Interest in Corporate and
Securities Law: Threats and Safeguards in the Determination of Auditor
Independence, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 519 (2002). The ISB was formed to develop "'a
conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of public entities
which will serve as the foundation for the development of principles-based
independence standards."' Id. at 525 (quoting Independence Standards Board
Operation Policies, art. 1, para. 1.B, at http://www.cpaindependence.org. "Events
in the form of changing political climate... led the SEC to abandon its commit-
ment to the ISB as an agency for formulating independence concepts (subject to
SEC acceptance). The ISB, at the suggestion of the SEC, dissolved in July of
2001." Id. at 525.
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d. Familiarity (or trust) threats--threats that arise from auditors being
influenced by a close relationship with an auditee....
e. Intimidation threats-threats that arise from auditors being, or
believing that they are being, overtly or covertly coerced by auditees or by
other interested parties.
38
Of the five threats listed, self-interest and familiarity threats were the
primary reasons for Andersen's lack of objectivity. As noted previously, in
2001, Andersen received $25 million for Enron's audit, and another $27
million for non-audit services.39 This amounted to $1 million a week in fees
from Enron.4° While these fees represented only a small portion of
Andersen's total fees received,4 it is likely that the Andersen staff and
partners associated with Enron's account received personal gains for their
work. At a minimum, retaining a satisfied client could have advanced an
accountant's potential career opportunities at Andersen and at Enron.
Familiarity threats also impaired the objectivity of the Andersen staff.
Andersen employees had offices at Enron headquarters where they worked
throughout the year.42 Accounting staff assigned to a particular client for
multiple years often create relationships with the client's employees similar
to the relationships between co-workers.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was the government's response to the
problems that arose from the public accounting profession's lack of
objectivity, necessary to perform the "public watchdog" function that
auditors are expected to perform.43 If the Act's requirements had been
imposed years ago, would it have prevented Andersen's role in Enron's
demise? Since self-interest and familiarity threats were the underlying
issues that prompted Andersen's actions, the question can be restated: If the
Act had been imposed years ago, would the self-interest and familiarity
threats to Andersen's objectivity in dealing with Enron have been
substantially reduced or eliminated?
To answer this question, the regulatory system that existed when Enron
collapsed must be examined. Also, the Act's provision must be examined
to determine what changes it makes to current practices. Finally, one must
3 Id. at 528-29.
'9 Worden, supra note 24, at 521.
4 0 id.
41 See Rhode & Paton, supra note 15, at 10.
42 Adrian Michaels, Andersen Faces Enron Documents Claim, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2002, http://www.aicpa.org/news/2002/011402g.htm.
'3 See Worden, supra note 24, at 516-17.
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address whether those changes will reduce or eliminate the threats identi-
fied previously.
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION BEFORE THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
State boards of accountancy regulate the threshold standards required
to become a CPA and to practice in the public accounting profession. Many
standards are uniform among states; however, there are variations.
Examples of these standards include requiring higher education credit hours
in accounting courses, passing the uniform CPA examination, and
mandatory apprenticeships with an experienced CPA. Once CPA candi-
dates meet the necessary requirements, they receive a license to practice
from the appropriate state board of accountancy. The board is then
responsible for the renewal of CPA licenses and the monitoring of
continuing education requirements. The licensing scheme is analogous to
that of the legal profession and the regulations of the American Bar
Association.
Once licensed, a CPA is eligible for membership in the AICPA,44 which
offers both individual and firm memberships. Because membership in the
AICPA lends credibility to a public accounting firm's reputation, rarely
would a public accounting firm choose not to be a member. In addition,
AICPA membership provides the firm with a professional association
advantageous for sharing information, technical advice, journal subscrip-
tions, group health or life insurance programs, and other services.
Once a member of the AICPA, public accountants are subject to the
standards and rules promulgated by the organization, such as the Code of
Professional Conduct.45 This Code contains certain guiding principles and
rules concerning ethical issues facing the public accounting profession.
Additionally, the AICPA has also established the Statements on Auditing
Standards, which serve as auditing guidelines, giving precise instructions
44 In addition to seeking membership to the AICPA, a CPA also seeks a
membership in their parallel state institute of Certified Public Accountants. For
example, a CPA in Kentucky is licensed by the Kentucky State Board of
Accountancy, and then may choose to seek membership in the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants and the Kentucky Society of Certified Public
Accountants.
45 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, Code of Professional Con-
duct, in AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 4269, 4269 (200 1) [hereinafter Code
ofProfessional Conduct], available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/cornp.htm.
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on every aspect of the audit process. 46 Additionally, the AICPA has also
enacted peer review standards for its members, which provide a process
through which the AICPA can monitor its members' compliance with the
organization's governing standards.47 Members of the AICPA who audit
public companies must also join the AICPA senior committee known as the
Securities Exchange Commission Practice Section ("SECPS").4' 8 To obtain
the mandatory membership to the SECPS, a public accounting firm must
meet stringent membership requirements.49
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") issued
additional regulations for companies that audit financial statements filed
with the SEC."0 These requirements were intended to heighten the standards
concerning auditor independence. 1 Due to implementation dates in the
regulations, however, many regulatory requirements have not yet been
integrated into the public accounting profession. 2
For purposes of the Part V analysis, it will be assumed that public
accountants are all properly licensed by their state boards of accountancy
and that they are members of the AICPA. In summary, subject to the above
assumption, the public accounting profession must comply with the
following regulations when auditing financial statements: (1) AICPA Code
of Professional Conduct; (2) AICPA Statements on Auditing Standards; (3)
AICPA Peer Review Standards; (4) SECPS Membership Requirements (if
41 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, U.S. Auditing Standards, in
AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 51, 51 (2001) [hereinafter U.S. Auditing
Standards].
47 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, Peer Review, in AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 17,651, 17,651 - 17,921 (2001) [hereinafter Peer
Review].
41 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, Bylaws, in AICPA PROFES-
SIONAL STANDARDS 5301, 5361 (2001) [hereinafter Bylaws], available at http://
www.aicpa.org/about/bylaws/sec230.htm.
49 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS: SEC PRACTICE SECTION-
REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERS, paras. a-p, http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/
secps/require.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter SEC PRACTICE SECTION
-REQUIREMENTS].
50 SEC Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2003).
"' Id. ("Section 210.2-01 is designed to ensure that auditors are qualified and
independent of their audit clients both in fact and in appearance. Accordingly, the
rule sets forth restrictions on financial, employment, and business relationships
between an accountant and an audit client and restrictions on an accountant
providing certain non-audit services to an audit client.").
21d. § 210.2-01(e).
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the public accounting firm is an auditor of public companies); and, (5) 17
C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (if the public accounting firm audits financial statements
that are filed with the SEC).
IV. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AFTER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
The Act was passed in July 2002,"3 and it is divided into eleven
sections called "Titles."54 This analysis of the Act will focus on Title I,
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; Title I, Auditor Independ-
ence; and Title VIII, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability. The Act
is a federal law that adds to existing regulations described in Part M1."55 The
Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
("PCAOB")56 to promulgate regulations57 that apply to public accounting
firms registered with the PCAOB. The application of these regulations will
be discussed in more detail in Part V.58 Generally, the PCAOB regulations
will apply to public accounting firms that audit public companies.
The Act mandates that the PCAOB impose minimum requirements on
the accounting firms registered with it.59 The PCAOB will pass detailed
regulations in addition to the minimum requirements to achieve the
purported purpose of the Act,6" which is "[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.' In promulgating
the regulations, the PCAOB is encouraged to adopt standards proposed by
other public accounting regulatory agencies, such as the AICPA.62 The
minimum requirements stated in the Act will be the focus of this Note.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
As discussed in Part IV,63 the Act establishes minimum requirements
that the PCAOB must promulgate. Since the Act was passed in response to
" Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.).
54 id.
55 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
56 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (a) (2003).
57Id. § 7213(a)(1).
18 See infra notes 63-179 and accompanying text.
19 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2).
60 Id. § 7213(a)(3).
61 H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
62 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1), (3).
63 See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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Enron, it is logical to assume that legislators intended for the Act's
requirements to prevent a future Enron debacle. In Part 1I,6 self-interest and
familiarity were recognized as threats to Andersen's objectivity in dealing
with Enron. This section of the Note will analyze the new requirements of
the Act as they relate to the public accounting profession. These require-
ments will be compared to the pre-Act regulations that were discussed in
Part 111.65 Then the following question will be addressed with each new
requirement analyzed: Will the difference between the new requirements
and the pre-Act regulations substantially reduce or eliminate the self-
interest and familiarity threats in order to prevent the public accounting
profession from contributing to a future Enron?
A. Title I-Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
1. Development and Composition of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
The most notable requirement of the Act is the establishment of the
PCAOB. The PCAOB is a non-profit organization that will exist until
Congress dissolves it.66 The Act mandates that PCAOB consist of five
members, two CPAs and three non-CPAs.6' The Chairperson of the
PCAOB cannot be a CPA unless he or she has not practiced in the public
accounting field within a five-year period before his or her appointment as
a PCAOB member.68 Members of the PCAOB must be knowledgeable in
financial disclosures required of public companies that file with the SEC.69
In addition, members are to be "prominent individuals of integrity and
reputation who have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of
investors and the public ...."" The members will serve on a "full-time
basis"'" for up to two five-year terms, 72 and they "may not, concurrent with
service on the Board, be employed by any other person or engage in any
other professional or business activity."73 Registration fees collected by the
6 See supra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
66 15 U.S.C. § 721 1(a).
6 7Id. § 7211(e).
6 1 Id. § 7211 (e)(2).
69 1d. § 7211 (e)(1).
70 id.
71 Id. § 7211(e)(3).
72 Id. § 721 l(e)(5)(A), (B).
73Id. § 7211(e)(3).
2003-20041
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PCAOB from public accounting firms that audit public companies will fund
the Board.74 The purpose of the PCAOB is
to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities
laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and
further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and
independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold
to, and held by and for, public investors.75
The AICPA Board of Directors and the SECPS committee are the pre-
Act governing bodies designed to oversee the audits of public companies.76
The AICPA is a non-profit organization; 77 its Board of Directors is
composed of a chairman, vice chairman, immediate past chairman,
president, sixteen present or former members of the AICPA council, and
three representatives who are not members of the AICPA.7 ' The SECPS is
a senior committee of the AICPA that is composed of fourteen representa-
tives from public accounting firms that audit public companies." The
AICPA recognizes its responsibility to the investing public in its Code of
Professional Conduct as follows:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility
to the public. The accounting profession's public consists of clients, credit
grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and financial
community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of
certified public accountants to maintain the orderly functioning of
commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest responsibility on
certified public accountants. The public interest is defined as the
collective well-being of the community of people and institutions the
profession serves.
80
74Id. § 7219(c)(1).
75 Id. § 7211 (a).
76 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS: SECPS REFERENCE MANUAL
§ 1000.09 (2001) [hereinafter SECPS REFERENCE MANUAL], http://ftp.aicpa.
org/public/download/members/div/secps/referencemanual/ref1 000.pdf(last visited
Nov. 17, 2003).
77 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, 2001-2002 ANNUAL REPORT
34 (2002), http://www.aicpa.org/about/annrpt/2001-2002/index.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2003).
78 Bylaws, supra note 48, at 547 1, available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/
bylaws/sec340R.htm.
79 SECPS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 76, § 1000.09 to 1000.10.
80 Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 45, at 4301.
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The purposes of the PCAOB and the AICPA are consistent, yet a
composition of the two governing bodies evinces significant differences.
A majority of the PCAOB are non-CPAs,8" while the AICPA' s twenty-three
member Board only has three non-CPA members.82 The PCAOB makeup
may reduce the self-interest threat in the public accounting industry
because non-CPA members are likely to have the objective distance
necessary to place investor needs before client or firm needs when
promulgating new standards. While the composition of the PCAOB and
AICPA might result in more objective standards, it is not clear that
unethical CPAs will be deterred. One commentator questioned whether
Enron was the result of individual deceit, and noted that "[t]here will
always exist businesspeople willing to take shortcuts."83 Furthermore,
except to the extent that non-CPAs are more willing to promulgate rules to
limit familiarity between auditors and auditees, the composition of the
PCAOB will not reduce the familiarity threat.
2. Registration with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Under the Act, a public accounting firm must be registered with the
PCAOB in order to audit a public company.84 The public accounting firm
is then required to file annual reports with the PCAOB.85 The annual report
must include the names of all the public companies that the accounting firm
audits and must disclose the fees received by the accounting firm from the
public companies for audit and non-audit services.8 6 Also, all professional
staff within a registered public accounting firm involved with public
company audits must be disclosed in the annual report. 87
Nevertheless, all public accounting firms auditing one or more
companies registered with the SEC have been required to join the SECPS
since 1990.88 Once a member, the public accounting firm is required to file
annual reports with the SECPS;89 the reports include the number of public
8 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e) (2003).
82 Bylaws, supra note 48, at 5441.
83 Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUs. & FIN. 127,138 (2002).
84 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
85 Id. § 7212(d).
86 Id. § 7212(b)(2).
7 Id. § 7212(b)(2)(E).
88 See Bylaws, supra note 48, at 5361.
89 SEC PRACTICE SECTION-REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49, para. g.
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companies audited and the gross fees received by the accounting firm from
those clients.90
The most notable difference between the pre- and post-Act require-
ments is that the PCAOB registration and filing system requires more
detailed information. Specificity provides for more efficient monitoring
of familiarity threats and self-interest. The PCAOB annual reports monitor
familiarity by naming the individual CPAs associated with the auditee,92
and the reports monitor self-interest by requiring disclosure of all financial
benefits that flow from auditee to auditor.93 The AICPA and SECPS annual
filing system also monitors the threats, albeit less effectively. The Act
creates a new registration process that overlaps with the pre-Act registra-
tion process. The incremental specificity of the PCAOB process over the
AICPA process will reduce self-interest and familiarity threats.
3. Audit Workpaper Retention
The Act imposes a new audit workpaper retention requirement.94 Audit
workpapers include detailed evidence of the work that a public accounting
firm performed during an audit.9 These workpapers contain significant
information concerning findings during an audit and decisions made by
auditors concerning disclosure of those findings. 96 The Act now requires a
public accounting firm registered with the PCAOB to retain their audit
workpapers for seven years.97
In comparison, the AICPA regulatory framework does not impose a
specific period for workpaper retention.9" It does, however, address this
issue. Statements on Auditing Standards state that the "auditor should adopt
reasonable procedures for safe custody of his working papers and should
retain them for a period sufficient to meet the needs of his practice and to
satisfy any pertinent legal requirements of records retention." 99
90 Id.
9' See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 7212(b)(2)(E).
93 Id. § 7212(b)(2)(B).
94 Id. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i).
9' For a definition of workpapers, see US. Auditing Standards, supra note 46,
at 606.
96 See id.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i).
98 See US. Auditing Standards, supra note 46, at 607.
99 Id.
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It is unclear which of the two audit workpaper retention standards is
most likely to reduce self-interest and familiarity threats to auditor
independence. The bright-line Act requirement has the attractive feature of
giving notice, while the AICPA requirement is more flexible. The Act's
requirement overlaps with the AICPA requirement providing, at best, a
small reduction of self-interest and familiarity threats.
4. Second Partner Review
The Act requires a second partner review.00 To understand this
requirement, it is necessary to briefly describe the audit process. 01 An audit
begins with planning, and once the planning phase is complete, fieldwork
begins. 2 During fieldwork, the audit team studies detailed accounting
records in order to determine if elements of the auditee's financial
statements are reported correctly. 3 After fieldwork is finished, the audit
team prepares its opinion.'0 4 The partner-in-charge of the audit then
carefully reviews the work of the audit team and signs off on the audit.'05
The second partner review requirement of the Act mandates that another
partner in the firm who is not associated with the auditee sign off on the
audit work as well.
10 6
The pre-Act requirement for second partner review was identical. The
AICPA addressed this issue in its quality control standards, 07 and the
SECPS addressed it in its membership requirements.0 8 AICPA quality
control standard, QC Section 20.18, in instructing members on how to
design their firm's quality control system, states:
o See 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(ii).
101 This description of the audit process is oversimplified, but it is sufficient to
illustrate the meaning of a second partner review.
102 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTSnternational Standards on
Auditing, in AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 12,001, 12,311 - 12,312 (2001).
103 See generally id. at 12,311 - 12,385 (detailing general procedures for audit-
ing).
"o See generally id. at 12,421 - 12,430 (describing the auditor's report on finan-
cial statements).
10S ee id. at 12,425.
106 See 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2003).
107 See 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, Quality Control, in
AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 17,001, 17,034 (2001) [hereinafter Quality
Control].
108 See SEC PRACTICE SECTION-REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49, para. f.
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To the extent appropriate and as required by applicable professional
standards, these policies and procedures should cover... supervising
[and] reviewing... the results of each engagement. Where applicable,
these policies and procedures should also address the concurring partner
review requirements applicable to SEC engagements as set forth in
membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA.10 9
Furthermore, the SECPS mandates a second partner review in its member-
ship requirements as follows:
Member firms shall be obligated to . . . [e]stablish policies and
procedures that meet the requirements set forth in the SECPS Reference
Manual, for a concurring review of the audit report and the financial
statements by a partner other than the audit partner-in-charge of an SEC
engagement before issuance of an audit report on the financial statements
of an SEC engagement .... 110
The Act adds nothing new by mandating a second partner review, and there
is no concurrent reduction of the self-interest or familiarity threats to the
objectivity of a public accountant or a public accounting firm.
5. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board Quality Control Standards
The Act requires that the PCAOB promulgate quality control standards
that would apply to public accounting firms registered with the PCAOB."'
Those quality control standards relate to: (1) monitoring professional ethics
and independence; (2) in-firm consultation on accounting and auditing
questions; (3) hiring, professional development, and advancement of
personnel; (4) acceptance and continuation of engagements; and (5) internal
inspection and other requirements." 12 The AICPA has promulgated, in its
quality control standards, regulation on each of the five topics listed in the
Act noted above as follows: (1) Quality Control Standards Sections 20.09
and 20.10 regulate "[i]ndependence, [i]ntegrity, and [o]bjectivity;' 13 (2)
Quality Control Standards Section 20.18 regulates "[e]ngagement [p]erfor-
'" Quality Control, supra note 107, at 17,034.
110 See SEC PRACTICE SECTION-REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49, para. f.
.. See 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (2003).
112 See id.
113 Quality Control, supra note 107, at 17,033.
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mance," which includes supervision;" 4 (3) Quality Control Standards
Section 40.02 regulates "[p]ersonnel [m]anagement;"'' 5 (4) Quality Control
Standards Sections 20.14 and 20.15 regulate "[a]cceptance and [c]ontin-
uance of [c]lients and [e]ngagements;""' 6 and (5) Quality Control Stan-
dards Section 30.03 regulates "[m]onitoring [p]rocedures." ' 7
Once again, the Act adds nothing new to quality control standards,
given that the AICPA has been regulating these issues for years. The
AICPA quality control standards are mandatory for public accountants
wishing to maintain good standing with the AICPA."' Violations of the
standards would result in sanctions.' Likewise, the PCAOB quality
control standards are mandatory for public accountants wishing to maintain
good standing with the PCAOB. 12 ° Violations of those standards would also
result in sanctions.12' It is likely that the PCAOB will rely on the regula-
tions of the AICPA when promulgating its own regulations.
6. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Inspection
The Act charges the PCAOB with the duty of inspecting public
accounting firms that are registered with it.' 22 The public accounting firms
are to be inspected tri-annually if they audit less than one hundred public
companies in a year, and annually if they audit more than one hundred
public companies in a year. 23 The inspections are required to include an
examination of selected audit workpaper files, evaluation of the quality
control that a firm has in place, and other procedures that are appropriate
and necessary. 124 In comparison, the SECPS requires its members to
undergo peer review every three years.125 The AICPA peer review includes
selected engagements and a review of a firm's compliance with its system
of quality control at all organizational and functional levels within the
firm.'
126
"1
4 Id. at 17,034.
"
51 d. at 17,071.
"16 Id. at 17,034.
11 Id. at 17,051 - 17,054.
..8 See id. at 17,031.
".. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
120 See 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) (2003).
121 See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
122 15 U.S.C. § 7214.
" Id. § 7214(b).
124 Id. § 7214(d).
125 See SEC PRACTICE SECTION-REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49, para. c.
126 Peer Review, supra note 47, at 17,708.
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The substance of the PCAOB inspection and AICPA peer review are
almost the same. A notable difference in the two systems is that under the
Act, public accounting firms auditing more than one hundred public
companies must undergo inspection annually.'27 This enhanced inspection
requirement will be effective in reducing self-interest and familiarity threats
because undergoing scrutiny by CPAs who are not members of the firm
allows self-interest and familiarity threats to be detected and eliminated.
The two systems overlap, but the Act does add additional protection.
7. Sanctions and Disciplinary Proceedings
In order to warrant punishment, violations under the Act must rise to
the level of either intentional or knowing conduct, which includes reckless
or repeated instances of negligent conduct. 128 Punishments include
temporary suspension or permanent revocation of registration, a prohibition
against any association between a CPA and a registered public accounting
firm, civil penalties, censures, or additional required professional educa-
tion. 29 Notice of sanctions is to be made by publication. 3 '
Under AICPA regulation, disciplinary options include expulsion or
suspension from the AICPA."' This punishment would include expulsion
from the SECPS, which would end relationships between public accounting
firms and public companies. Notice of the disciplinary action taken is made
by publication.
3 2
The Act and the AICPA differ very little in their disciplinary proce-
dures. Discipline for a professional under either of the schemes would be
detrimental to his or her career, and the Act's disciplinary provisions add
little to the pre-existing scheme. It is not likely that the Act's provisions
will reduce the self-interest and familiarity threats.
8. Summary
Title I will dramatically change the structure of the public accounting
profession. In analyzing the establishment of the PCAOB, this section of
the Note has identified four ways that the new governing body will attempt
.27 See 15 U.S.C. § 7214(b)(1)(A).
'
2
1 Id. § 7215(c)(5).
129 Id. § 7215(c)(4).
3' Id. § 7215(d).
13 See Bylaws, supra note 48, at 5931.
'
3 2 Id. at 5971.
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to reduce self-interest and familiarity threats. They are as follows: (1) The
PCAOB will be constituted by a majority of non-CPAs, which will reduce
the conflict inherent in both regulating and benefiting from the accounting
profession; (2) Enhanced specificity of annual reports filed by public
accounting firms with the PCAOB will simplify monitoring of self-interest
and familiarity between an auditor and an auditee; (3) A bright-line audit
workpaper retention requirement will provide notice to CPAs who may be
tempted to destroy workpapers to advance their self-interests;' 3 and (4)
Annual inspections of public accounting firms that audit public companies
will provide an objective assessment of whether or not self-interest and
familiarity threats exist. While acknowledging the above four advantages
of the Act, it must be noted that the advantages do not outweigh the
dramatic change that the Act will have on the public accounting profession.
These changes could have been implemented another way, such as through
action taken by the AICPA, which was not afforded the time to adapt to
Enron's failure and act on its own before the federal government took
action. Alternatively, the federal government could have promulgated the
regulations that create the previously mentioned advantages through the
SEC. The government chose, however, to create an entirely new governing
body with substantial overlap between these existing governing bodies.
B. Title I-Auditor Independence
The foundation of the public accounting profession is independence
and objectivity."' Traditionally, auditors have had little stake in their audit
... The benefit of this Sarbanes-Oxley requirement is not entirely clear. As
noted in subsection 3, the new Sarbanes-Oxley requirement does not have the
flexibility that is found in the AICPA requirement. See supra notes 94-99 and
accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 45, at 4321 ("[A]
member who provides auditing and other attestation services should be independent
in fact and appearance. In providing all other services, a member should maintain
objectivity and avoid conflicts of interest."); id. at 4341 ("Integrity requires that
service and the public trust not be subordinated to personal gain and advantage.
Objectivity and independence require that members be free from conflicts in
discharging professional responsibilities."); U.S. Auditing Standards, supra note
46, at 161 ("In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental
attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors."); id. (independence implies
a "judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation for fairness not only to
management and owners of a business but also to creditors and those who may
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clients, but as the complexity of business has developed, auditors have
become financial advisors providing non-audit services.135 One commenta-
tor noted that non-audit services made up fifty percent of the top five public
accounting firms' revenues in 1999 versus thirteen percent in 1981,136 and
that many public accounting firms underprice their audit services in order
to gain more profitable non-audit services from the auditee."' It is well
recognized by the public accounting profession that the combination of
audit and non-audit services can decrease an auditor's objectivity toward
its audit client, thus impairing independence. 138 Auditors gain financially,
however, by using their expertise to attract additional services and fees. 3 9
In addition, auditees receive benefits from their auditor's expertise in the
form of higher quality services. 40 Consequently, there is a tension between
impairing independence and exploiting the benefits that can arise from the
auditor/auditee relationship. Until the Act was imposed, that tension had
been remedied by impressing upon auditors the need to retain professional
skepticism towards their clients and to take responsibility for dealing with
individual independence impairments.' 4 ' As noted above, independence
impairments that threaten objectivity arise from self-interest and familiar-
ity.142 The components of the Act analyzed in this section attempt to
address this problem by reducing self-interest and familiarity threats that
arise from auditor independence impairments.
otherwise rely (in part, at least) upon the independent auditor's report, as in the
case of prospective owners or creditors."); id. ("The profession has established,
through the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct, precepts to guard against the
presumption of loss of independence. 'Presumption' is stressed because the
possession of intrinsic independence is a matter of personal quality rather than of
rules that formulate certain objective tests. Insofar as these precepts have been
incorporated in the profession's code, they have the force of professional law for
the independent auditor.").
135 See Worden, supra note 24, at 516.
I36 d. at 517. Furthermore, revenues from non-audit services grew twenty-six
percent at public accounting firms from 1993 to 1999, compared to a nine percent
increase in the growth from audit services. Id.
137 id.
138 See id. at 517-18.
"9 See id. at 516-17.
'4o Id. at 523.
141 See, e.g., U.S. Auditing Standards, supra note 46, at 295 ("Due professional
care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism.").
142 See Allen & Siegel, supra note 37, at 528-29.
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1. Prohibition Against Audit and Non-Audit Services
The Act requires a registered public accounting firm that performs an
audit to refrain from providing non-audit services. 43 The prohibited non-
audit services include bookkeeping, designing financial information
systems, appraisal and valuations services, actuarial services, internal audit
outsourcing services, management functions, investment advisor services,
and legal services. 44 The Act provides some flexibility by retaining the
option to waive the prohibition in some circumstances.
45
The SEC has passed regulations minimizing non-audit services as
well. 46 17 C.F.R. section 210.2-01 prohibits bookkeeping, designing
financial information systems, appraisal and valuations, actuarial services,
internal audit outsourcing services, managerial services, broker services,
and legal services if the public accounting firm is also performing that
company's audit. 147 Several of the prohibitions are limited in application.
For example, auditors may assist in designing information systems,
appraisals and valuations, and actuarial services if management of the
company does the work, expresses determinations, and maintains involve-
ment in and control over the project. 41 Internal audit services can be
performed if the company is less complex' 49 or if the total hours the
auditors spend on those services are less than a certain percentage of the
total internal audit hours. 50 It is important to note that the statutory
prohibition against appraisal and valuations and internal audit services did
not take effect until August 5, 2002, almost a year after Enron's trouble
began. 1'
It is questionable whether the Act's attempt to curtail non-audit
services will reduce the self-interest and familiarity threats. At first glance,
the Act appears to be more of a blanket prohibition with fewer exceptions
than found in the SEC regulation. The Act did leave room for flexibility,
however, and it will be interesting to see whether rules promulgated by the
"41 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2003).
144id.
1451 Id. § 7231.
" See SEC Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4) (2003).
147 Id.
148 Id.
'49 Auditors may perform internal audit services if the auditee has $200 million
in assets or less. Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(v)(A).
150 An auditor can perform up to forty percent of the total hours spent on
internal audit within a company. Id.
'' Id. § 210.2-01(e)(1)(i).
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PCAOB will destroy that flexibility. Even if the Act is a blanket prohibi-
tion, the effect may not be a decrease of the self-interest and familiarity
threats. Under the Act, one public accounting firm registered with the
PCAOB will perform the client's audit while another public accounting
firm provides the same client with non-audit services. This may create new
problems, such as alliances between accounting firms that increase self-
interest and familiarity. Further, it is possible that the public accounting
firm performing non-audit services will not fall under the governing
umbrella of the PCAOB. It is at best unclear that the Act's attempt to
diminish non-audit services will positively affect auditor self-interest and
familiarity.
2. Rotation ofAudit Partners
The Act requires that the partner-in-charge of an audit and the second
reviewing partner rotate off of a client's audit after five consecutive
years. 52 The audit could then be assigned to other partners within the
public accounting firm who have not been involved with the audit.153
Partner rotation, however, was already a membership requirement of the
SECPS.' 54 That provision obligates an audit firm to "[a]ssign a new audit
partner to be in charge of each SEC engagement that has had another audit
partner-in-charge for a period of seven consecutive years, and prohibit such
incumbent partner from returning to in-charge status on the engagement for
"1155a minimum of two years ....
The rotation requirement is designed to reduce familiarity threats to
objectivity.'56 The requirements are effective for that purpose, but the Act
added nothing new. Instead, it reduced the number of years a partner
may serve before rotating from seven to five but failed to include the
SECPS's prohibition against the partner returning to in-charge status for
152 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(j) (2003).
153 Id.
154 SEC PRACTICE SECTION-REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49, para. e.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Commission Adopts Rules Strengthening
Auditor Independence (Jan. 22,2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-9.htm
(noting that the new rules, including mandatory partner rotation, are designed to
increase auditor independence). The AICPA provides a link to this site from its
own site, which also discusses auditor independence. See AICPA, SEC Approves
New Rules on Auditor Independence and Workpaper Retention, at http:/www.
aicpa.org/sarbanes/secproposesrules.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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two years.157 Moreover, reducing the potential years of service from seven
to five does not add an incremental element of familiarity threat reduction
according to an AICPA study. 158 That study found to the contrary that
"allegations of audit failure occur much more frequently when a firm is in
its first couple of years as a company's auditors."'59 Since the threat of
failure exists during the beginning of an auditor's relationship with an
auditee rather than at the end, reducing the number of years before rotation
will have little effect on audit integrity.
3. Auditee Recruitment ofAuditors
The Act states that auditor independence is destroyed if an auditor in
a public accounting firm ends a career with that firm and within one year
begins a career as a C.E.O., C.F.O., C.A.O., or the equivalent with a
company that they audited.16 It is common for a CPA to work for a public
accounting firm, and later make a lateral career move to a company they
have been auditing. The auditor has inside knowledge and experience with
the auditee, and this expertise can be valuable to the auditee.
In 17 C.F.R. section 210.2-01, the SEC promulgated a similar mandate
destroying auditor independence in certain situations. 161 If a former
employee of a public accounting firm holds a position with any of the
firm's audit clients, then the firm is not independent. 162 The regulation has
157 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) ("It shall be unlawful for a registered public
accounting firm to provide audit services to an issuer if the lead (or coordinating)
audit partner (having primary responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner
responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in
each of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer."), with SEC PRACTICE
SECTION-REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49, para. e ("Member firms shall be
obligated to ...[a]ssign a new audit partner to be in charge of each SEC
engagement that has had another audit partner-in-charge for a period of seven
consecutive years, and prohibit such incumbent partner from returning to in-charge
status on the engagement for a minimum of two years ....").
"' Statement of Position, AICPA, Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit
Firms of Publicly Held Companies (Mar. 24, 1992) [hereinafter Statement of
Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation], http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/
secps/lit/sops/1 900.htm.
159 Id.
160 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(1) (2003).
161 SEC Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2)(iii) (2003).
162 Id.
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an exception."" If the employee does not influence financial decisions
within the company and has no financial arrangement with the former
public accounting firm, then independence is not impaired."
The Act adds no new requirements with respect to impairment of
independence by auditee recruitment of auditors. Only minor adjustments
were made in the Act to pre-existing SEC requirements. Therefore, the SEC
regulations already in place were sufficient to reduce the familiarity threats
associated with auditee recruitment.
4. Summary
Title II of the Act adds nothing new to the regulatory framework that
was already in place. The Act's provisions, such as the prohibition of non-
audit services and mandatory partner rotation, mirror SEC regulations and
SECPS standards that were already in place. Because of the high degree of
overlap between the old and new regulations, it is unlikely that the new
regulations will result in a significant reduction of audit failure due to
familiarity or lack of auditor objectivity.
C. Title VIII-Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
1. Destroying or Altering Records
The Act creates a new federal criminal law regarding the destruction
or alteration of records.'65 The law is intended to deter the destruction of
documents by auditors as Andersen destroyed documents from the Enron
audit."6 The new law reads:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation
or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States or any case file under title 11,
or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.167
163 Id. § 210.2-01(c)(2)(iii)(A)(1).
1641id.
165 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519-20 (2003).
' 6See supra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
167 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
[VOL. 92
EXPLORING THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Obstruction ofjustice is punished by imprisonment for not more than five
years in 18 U.S.C. § 1505.'68 The United States Sentencing Guidelines
classify a first obstruction ofjustice offense as punishable by ten to twenty-
four months of imprisonment. 6 9 The obstruction ofjustice law contains the
same culpability and conduct standards as the Act.17 The Act does extend
the obstruction of justice statute to acts done in contemplation of a federal
investigation; however, it has been noted that the obstruction of justice
statute was already being read broadly to include "all steps and stages in [a
proceeding] from its inception to its conclusion." ''
The most notable addition of the Act is the increase in the imprison-
ment penalty from five years to twenty years. To contrast, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines only impose a sentence of up to twenty-four
months.'7 2 The Act has mandated that a review of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines be performed and that appropriate amendments be
made to ensure deterrence and punishment under the new obstruction of
justice laws created by the Act.'73 A more substantial criminal penalty may
deter an auditor from destroying potential evidence if she finds herself in
Andersen's position. Until corresponding adjustments are made to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, however, the Act will have no impact on
actual sentencing for the crime of obstruction of justice.
2. Destruction of Corporate Audit Records
The Act creates a second criminal law that focuses on accountants that
states:
(a)(1) Any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of
securities... shall maintain all audit or review workpapers for a period
of 5 years from the end of the fiscal period in which the audit or review
was concluded.
(b) Whoever knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a)(1)...
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.
174
168 See 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
'69 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2 (2002); id. at ch. 5, pt.
A.
170 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
' Rice v. United States, 356 F,2d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1966).
'
7 2 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2002).
17' 28 U.S.C. § 994.
'74 18 U.S.C. § 1520.
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It is arguable that the federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1505, would deter the behavior that § 1520 intends to punish as well.175 It
has been noted that
[w]hile the new § 1520 looks like a novel offense targeting accountants,
prosecutors will likely not waste precious resources pursuing negligent or
sloppy recordkeeping. Rather, they will most likely use § 1520(b) when
they have reason to believe that accountants are behaving improp-
erly--that is, "knowingly and willfully" failing to maintain proper
corporate audit records.
76
The commentator then goes on to note that 18 U.S.C. § 1520 does not
technically create a new criminal law because auditor misconduct was
already punishable under the pre-existing obstruction ofjustice statutes.'77
The Act did establish an imprisonment penalty of ten years for an
auditor who obstructs justice. This is an increase of five years from the
former general obstruction of justice penalty; however, there remains a
discrepancy between the penalty imposed by the Act and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Despite the increased penalty, the Guidelines
continue to recommend the same sentences for the new crime of auditor
obstruction of justice as the pre-existing general obstruction of justice
statute." 8
3. Summary
Neither of the two new criminal laws in title VIII of the Act appear to
add significant value to the criminal obstruction of justice law that was
already in place. The increased penalties may give a prosecutor more
bargaining room when prosecuting obstruction of justice cases.'7 9 Yet, if
increased bargaining room was the desired effect, the Act was not
necessary. In addition, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not currently
add additional punishment for the new laws created under the Act.
180
175Recent Legislation: Corporate Law-Congress Passes Corporate andAccount-
ing Fraud Legislation--Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 HARv. L. REv. 728, 732
(2002) [hereinafter Recent Legislation: Corporate Law].
176 id.
177 See id.
178 See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
179 Recent Legislation: Corporate Law, supra note 175, at 734.
"o See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
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VI. ANCILLARY ISSUES
A. Attorneys and Their Role in Enron
Attorneys were involved in Enron's unfortunate decisions in three
ways. First, Enron's in-house attorneys took part in the decision not to
combine the special entities' financial statements with those of Enron.' 8 '
Second, Enron's outside counsel prepared and reviewed proxy statements
and footnotes in documents to meet the SEC disclosure reporting require-
ments.8 2 Finally, Andersen's in-house counsel initiated the destruction of
the Andersen workpapers when it appeared likely that there would be an
investigation.1
83
Attorney misconduct can be driven by the same factors as CPA
misconduct. Both professions work under a billable hours system and strive
to achieve optimal realization rates and both are essentially dependent on
their clients' fees for their livelihood. Due to the nature of the services that
CPAs and attorneys perform, however, they should strive to maintain
independence and objectivity. Both are governed by their own professional
standards, and should put the integrity and respect of their profession
before their own personal gain. One commentator sees the Enron debacle
as a catalyst to encourage attorneys to scrutinize their profession much the
same way that the public accounting profession has been scrutinized.'
The Act addresses attorney conduct by increasing standards for
attorneys who practice before the SEC.15 The standards require attorneys
to report violations of securities laws or the breach of fiduciary duties
within the company. 1
86
181 See Rhode & Paton, supra note 15, at 17.
182 See id. at 19. Enron's outside counsel (Vinson and Elkins) "[p]rovided
advice and prepared documentation in connection with many of the [problematic]
transactions .... It also assisted Enron with the preparation of its disclosures of
related party transactions in the proxy statements and the footnotes to the financial
statements in Enron's periodic SEC filings." Id. (quoting William C. Powers,
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Comm. of the Board of
Directors of Enron Corp., Feb. 1, 2002, at 36).
183 See id. at 22.
"'84 Id. at 9. This section has briefly described the role attorneys played in Enron.
For further information on this topic, see id.
185 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
1
86 Id. That section states:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection
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B. Studies Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Act directed governmental agencies to perform various studies
concerning the public accounting profession. The General Accounting
Office was to perform two studies: one on mandatory rotation of registered
public accounting firms'87 and one on the factor that led to the numerous
consolidations of public accounting firms.' 88 Both studies were completed
by their July 30 deadline.8 9 The following are descriptions of those studies.
1. Mandatory Rotation of Registered Public Accounting Firms
The Act commissions a study to determine the effect of requiring
mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms.90 Mandatory
of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report
the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the
issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or
to the Board of directors.
Id.
'.
7 Id. § 7232.
'88 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 701, 116 Stat. 745,
797.
'89 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-864, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS:
MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION (2003), http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports/index.html.
'9 15 U.S.C. § 7232. This study is described as follows:
(a) STUDY AND REVIEW REQUIRED.-The Comptroller General
of the United States shall conduct a study and review of the potential effects
of requiring the mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms.
(c) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this section, the term "mandatory
rotation" refers to the imposition of a limit on the period of years in which
a particular registered public accounting firm may be the auditor of record
for a particular issuer.
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rotation of public accounting firms would reduce self-interest and famil-
iarity; in fact, it may be the most effective method of doing so. The need for
auditors to form inappropriately close relationships with their client in
hopes of keeping that client's long term business would be discouraged, or
at least alleviated, but the ex ante knowledge that a particular accounting
firm would be involved with a client only for a fixed number of years.
Despite its advantages, mandatory rotation of public accounting firms
could create problems. First, mandatory rotation could change market place
competition among public accounting firms. There are limited numbers of
public accounting firms that are in positions to audit public companies. A
public company might be forced to choose from a small number of
accounting firms, thus driving up the price of audits. Second, because of the
intricacies involved in audits, a new public accounting firm displacing an
old firm would have to deal with the displaced firm to plan and perform its
audit. This may create relationships between public accounting firms,
which could potentially become alliances and create the self-interest and
familiarity threats that public accounting firms formerly had with public
company clients.
Despite the identified problems of potentially higher audit prices and
closer relationships between accounting firms, mandatory rotation of public
accounting firms might be an effective solution to reduce self-interest and
familiarity. This proposed study should help enlighten the impact of
rotation on audit integrity. Therefore, reviewing the results of the study will
likely be an important step towards improvement of the public accounting
profession.
2. Factors that Have Led to
Consolidation of Public Accounting Firms
The Act also mandates a study to determine the factors that have
caused a consolidation of public accounting firms. 9' The federal govern-
ment must theorize that the lack of competition among accounting firms has
'9' Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 701. The study is described as follows:
(a) STUDY REQUIRED.-The Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct a study---
(1) to identify-
(A) the factors that have led to the consolidation of public accounting
firms since 1989 and the consequent reduction in the number of firms
capable of providing audit services to large national and multi-national
business organizations that are subject to the securities laws ....
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created a monopoly in the audits of public companies. The Act recognizes
the potential problems caused by the lack of competition as "(A) higher
[auditing] costs; (B) lower quality of [accounting] services; (C) impairment
of auditor independence; or (D) lack of choice." 192 The additional
regulation imposed on the public accounting profession should make it
more difficult for public accounting firms that do not audit public
companies to enter that market.
Increased competition among the public accounting profession is not
consistent with reducing self-interest and familiarity threats. In fact,
increased competition will force public accounting firms to align them-
selves with their clients in order to retain them. An auditor should not be
aligned with his or her client, but instead, should be objective with no
interest in the outcome of the audit. Increased competition will lower
auditing costs, which can lead to shortcuts by auditors so that they can
maintain their profits. The lower the quality of the audit, the fewer the
mistakes and flaws that the auditor will catch. For these reasons, auditors
and auditees should not be aligned.
C. The Cascade Effect
A substantial concern throughout the public accounting profession is
that the Act's requirements will apply to all audits and not just to audits of
public companies. 193 This is known as the "cascade effect."194 The reason
for concern is that small and mid-sized firms may not be able to financially
withstand the additional regulation imposed on their profession.195 Public
accounting firms are already subject to immense regulations as noted in
Part Eq. 196 Additional regulations will mean that firms will have to revamp
their audit, quality control, and peer review procedures. 197 This will be
quite costly to public accounting firms.198 Because of the prevalent
competition among small and mid-sized public accounting firms, it will be
difficult for public accounting firms to deal with these costs.
There are two ways that the Act could have the undesired cascade
effect on the public accounting profession. First, state boards of accoun-
192 id.
193 Russ Banham, Period ofAdjustment, 195 J. ACCT. 43, 45 (2003).
194 id.
195 id.
196 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 63-179 and accompanying text.
198E.g., Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation, supra note 158.
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tancy could adopt legislation requirements similar to the Act's requirements
which would apply to all CPAs licensed in that state. The Act directly
encourages this.199 Section 209 of Title II reads as follows:
In supervising nonregistered public accounting firms and their
associated persons, appropriate State regulatory authorities should make
an independent determination of the proper standards applicable,
particularly taking into consideration the size and nature of the business
of the accounting firms they supervise and the size and nature of the
business of the clients of those firms. The standards applied by the Board
under this Act should not be presumed to be applicable for purposes of
this section for small and medium sized nonregistered public accounting
firms.
20 0
It would take very few Enron-like debacles before states would adopt
the Act's requirements. Consider this example that could prompt a state to
adopt the Act. A central Kentucky public accounting firm may not have any
clients that are public companies, so they do not register with the PCAOB
and are not subject to the Act's requirements. Assume that the public
accounting firm audits a local bank and that the bank managers and the
auditors are familiar with each other. They may be members of the same
club, have children that go to school together, or have other connections
that create familiarity threats to objectivity. In addition, the bank could be
one of the public accounting firms largest clients, creating a self-interest
threat to objectivity. Now, imagine that the bank fails. Jobs would be lost
and depositors, debtors, and others would be hurt. This is an Enron-like
situation on a smaller scale. It is likely that the state would look to the
federal government's reaction to Enron in order to determine the appropri-
ate remedy to the state problem. Thus, the state would adopt the Act's
requirements, and other states would probably follow. This would be
detrimental to small and mid-sized accounting fiifts.
The second way that the Act could have a cascade effect on small
and mid-sized accounting firms is through audits of governmental
agencies. Many governmental agencies require annual audits depending
on the amount of government funds they receive.2° 1 The General Account-
ing Office has issued special auditing requirements for governmental
'99 15 U.S.C. § 7234 (2003).
2 
200 
id.
201 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 3052.200 (2003).
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agencies." 2 The special requirements for governmental agencies are
analogous to the special requirements for public company audits in that
they are intended to protect a particular group. In the case of public
company audits, the goal is to protect investors from manager deceptions.2 3
In the case of governmental audits, the goal is to protect taxpayers from
government official mismanagement.2 4 The General Accounting Office
may see the Act's requirements as appropriate to protect taxpayers as well
as investors. Many small and mid-sized public accounting firms have taken
on governmental audits because they can be performed outside of the tax
season. This provides an additional stream of revenue, but because of the
bidding process, governmental audit fees are often low. If the Government
Accounting Office adopted the Act's requirements for governmental audits,
small and mid-sized firms may be forced to discontinue those audits which
would eliminate an entire stream of revenue for those firms.
VII. CONCLUSION
A detailed comparison of the regulatory framework before and after the
Act and its requirements reveals that it does not achieve the goal of
"improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to securities laws.... "205 In other words, the Act does not make
the changes necessary to reduce self-interest and familiarity threats to
auditor objectivity. The Act is not necessary to achieve that purpose
because the AICPA and the SEC are adequate governing bodies to oversee
the public accounting profession and to deal with problems such as those
that led to the Enron debacle.
Further, the PCAOB will likely adopt the AICPA framework into the
rules they promulgate. 26 Following are two actions that the AICPA should
take to reduce self-interest and familiarity threats. First, as discussed in Part
VI,2" 7 the mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms would
be an effective step in reducing self-interest and familiarity. 28 The rotation
202 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-673G, GOVERNMENT AUDITING
STANDARDS § 1.01 (2003) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS],
http://www.gao.gov/govaud/yb2003.pdf.
203 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
204 See GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 202, § 1.02.
205 H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
206 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (2003).
207 See supra notes 181-204 and accompanying text.
208 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
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cycle should be relatively lengthy, maybe seven to ten years, in order to
allow auditors to reach their optimal auditing potential. The ex ante
knowledge that the auditor/auditee relationship will end in a fixed number
of years will create a more objective attitude towards the auditor/auditee
relationship. This would be especially effective to reduce familiarity threats
to auditor objectivity.
Second, the AICPA should form an independent audit fee review
committee. The committee should consist of CPAs and non-CPAs who are
familiar with the intricacies of performing and billing audits. The commit-
tee should review details of the billings and the fees received by public
accounting firms from public companies. Every public accounting firm
registered with the SECPS should have at least one public company audit
client reviewed annually. Audit clients should be chosen for review based
on random sampling. All fees, including non-audit fees, for the audit clients
chosen should be included in the detailed review. The review should
primarily focus on identifying self-interest threats to the objectivity of an
auditor that arise because of the fees received by the public accounting firm
from the auditee.
When the federal government implemented the Act, it intended to
protect the investing public from the public accounting profession.0 9 The
reality of the Act is that it did nothing substantial to achieve that purpose.
Further, the public accounting profession did not need the federal govern-
ment's intervention. The AICPA was and still is doing all that it can to
maintain the integrity of the public accounting profession. A few people
broke the rules. An entire profession should not be punished, and the
overall image of that profession should not be tarnished because of the
distasteful conduct of a few.
209 H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
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